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Focus o f Attention, Need to Evaluate, and Self-Monitoring in Social Anxiety Disorder
Chair: John W. Klocek, Ph.D.
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Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most prevalent anxiety disorders and
follows a chronic and unremitting course. Although several effective treatments for SAD
have been documented, additional attention must be paid to the constructs involved with
SAD in order to better understand and more effectively treat this illness. Because this
disorder involves faulty cognitions, existing research was reviewed with regard to
cognitive content and processes pertaining to SAD. Special emphasis was paid to self
focused attention as it relates to the disorder. It was argued that research in this area
should begin to examine individual traits or other personality constructs to leam more
about SAD. It was hypothesized that a relatively new construct, the Need to Evaluate,
might relate to social anxiety. In addition, it was hypothesized that the personality trait
Self-Monitoring might also play a role in social anxiety. All three variables were entered
into a regression equation predicting level of social anxiety. Results indicated that focus
of attention and Self-Monitoring did predict level of social anxiety. However, the
relationship between Need to Evaluate and SAD needs further study.
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Focus o f Attention, Need to Evaluate, and Self-M onitoring in Social Anxiety D isorder
Recent advances have been made in the study of Social Anxiety D isorder (SAD).
Although the disorder was deem ed the “neglected anxiety disorder” in a review by
Liebowitz and colleagues (1985), the past decade has produced research to more clearly
define prevalence rates, symptoms, and cognitive processes underlying SAD. The field
has made tremendous progress in terms of identifying symptomology, subtypes of the
disorder, and the cognitive processes involved in SAD. However, many aspects of social
anxiety remain unclear, including cognitive variables that may mediate and m oderate the
course o f the illness, as well as personality constructs that may influence vulnerability to
and course of the anxiety. New constructs and methodology m ust be exam ined to further
the understanding of SAD, not only for theoretical purposes, but also for the refinement
of existing treatment models.
Background Information
Kessler et al. (1994) found lifetime prevalence rates for SAD that exceeded many
other psychological illnesses. Lifetime prevalence of SAD was determined as 11.1% for
men and 15.5% for women. Estimates of gender distribution in SAD have produced
ratios as high as 2:1 female to male (Schneier, Johnson, H om ig, Liebowitz, &
W esissman, 1992). However, these discrepancies have been exam ined with evidence that
females have sought treatm ent for social anxiety more often and have biased the
prevalence rates (Rapee, Sanderson, & Barlow, 1988). Data from the multi-site
Epidemiologic Catchment Area (EGA) study yielded additional information
demonstrating that SAD tended to afflict less educated populations, those who were
single, and members of lower socioeconomic classes (Schneier et al., 1992). In addition.
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SAD was m ost prevalent among first-degree relatives of out- and in-patients with SAD
(Fyer, M annuzza, Chapman, Liebowitz, & Klein, 1993).
Using retrospective recall, EGA data yielded information that SAD patients
reported onset as having occurred during the mid- to late teens with a mean age of 15.5
years (Schneier et al., 1992). However, this distribution was skewed. Almost half of this
sample (47%) described lifelong symptoms with onset occurring prior to age 10. Some
have argued that this disorder requires the individual.to possess an awareness of others
and that such an awareness is rarely developed before age 8. However, research provides
evidence that some socially fearful behavior can be found in infants as young as 12
months and that such behaviors are pervasive across the lifespan (Rapee, 1995). Further
evidence for early development can be found in the rarity of onset after age 25 (Schneier
et al., 1992). Early onset and pervasiveness across the lifespan suggest that personality
constructs or dispositions may have more influence over social anxiety than previously
thought, suggesting that existing treatment models may be improved by targeting such
characteristics.
SAD tends to follow a chronic and unremitting course. In a survey of 21 SAD
outpatients, the majority reported avoidance of social situations for most of their lives
(mean num ber of years equal to 15.3). Even more chronic was the persistence of
perceived distress in social situations, where the mean num ber of years of experienced
distress was 20.9 (Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Keys, 1986). Other studies have provided
sim ilar information, reporting symptom onset during adolescence and persistence
throughout adulthood (Levy-Cushman, McBride, & Abeles, 1999; LePine & Lellouch,
1995). Although reported prevalence rates for SAD are highest in the 18-29 age bracket,
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prevalence rates for older adults (65+ years) m irror those for other age ranges (LevyCushm an, M cBride, & Abeles, 1999). Clearly, SAD does not diminish if not treated,
providing further support for the necessity of effective treatments.
The core feature of this disorder is the fear o f negative evaluation (Butler, 1985;
Turner, Beidel, & Townsley, 1992). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth
Edition- T. R. (APA, 2000) described this as, “A m arked and persistent fear of one or
more social or performance situations in which the person is exposed to unfamiliar
people or to possible scrutiny by others. The individual fears that he or she will act in a
way that will be hum iliating or embarrassing,” (p. 416). Exposure to this type of
situation m ust provoke anxiety, be recognized as unreasonable, be avoided, and cause
significant distress and interference with functioning.
The DSM -IV-TR distinguishes between two subtypes o f SAD. The
“Generalized” subtype indicates that the individual shows social anxiety in m ost areas of
his life. A “Nongeneralized” subtype, often referred to as “specific,” shows fear in only
one type o f social situation. Many researchers have explored the nature of subtypes, with
several posited delineations. Rapee (1995) gave details to further describe “Generalized”
and “Nongeneralized” subtypes. Generalized referred to social anxiety experienced in a
broad range of social contexts, including performance situations and social interaction
scenarios. According to a Turner, Beidel, and Townsley (1992) study o f 89 inpatients
diagnosed with SAD, the Generalized subtype resulted in increased interference with
functioning and was associated with increased severity of the disorder when compared to
the Nongeneralized subtype. In contrast, the Nongeneralized subtype referred to fears in
one area, usually performance situations. The m ost com m on fear in this subtype was
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public speaking. Decreased interference with daily activities was definitive of this
subtype when compared to the Generalized subtype, as only one area of life was affected
and thus was often a situation one could avoid. W hen com pared to the Generalized
subtype, this subtype was associated with decreased severity of symptoms as well.
Other delineations of subtype have been explored. Buss (1980) described
“fearful” versus “self-conscious” subtypes. Fearful referred to situations perceived to be
novel or intrusive, such as interactions with another person. Self-conscious subtype
referred to the perception of being evaluated or scrutinized by others, such as
performance situations. Eng, Heimberg, Liebowitz, and Schneier (1999) found evidence
to suggest that three subtypes might exist in SAD. Utilizing a sample of 382 diagnosed
SAD outpatients, responses to self-report measures were exam ined using cluster analysis.
The distinctions that emerged included pervasive social anxiety, moderate social
interaction anxiety, and dominant public speaking anxiety. Despite differences in the
nature o f subtypes, most researchers have posited a common distinction between
interaction and performance situation fears.
Another issue surrounds the classification of SAD as a distinct entity from
avoidant personality disorder (APD). Turner, Beidel, Borden, Stanley, and Jacob (1991)
demonstrated that generalized SAD often carries concurrent diagnoses of avoidant
personality disorder in both in- and out-patient samples. Rapee (1995) cited evidence
that little difference exists between social phobics with and without APD. However,
other studies have found that SAD with APD produces greater levels of depression
(Turner, Beidel, and Townsley, 1992). W hile it has been suggested that APD may
represent a potentially more severe subtype of SAD, other researchers have argued that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Anxiety

5

APD represents the extreme end of a continuum on which social anxiety falls in the
middle. M ore research is necessary in this area to delineate categorical versus
dimensional conceptualizations of this disorder.
SAD commonly occurs in concordance with other disorders. ECA data estim ated
comorbidity rates as high as 69% (Schneier et al., 1992). In a study of 71 SAD patients,
the m ost common comorbid disorders involved other anxiety disorders, mood disorders,
and substance abuse disorders (Turner et al., 1991). The most comm on comorbid anxiety
disorders were panic disorder and specific phobia. Common mood disorders, depression
and dysthymia, appeared to affect a large proportion of social phobics in the ECA study
and this type of comorbidity likely played a role in the development of suicidal ideation
(Schneier et al., 1992). Higher alcohol abuse rates were found in social phobics than in
other anxiety disorders (Kushner, Sher, & Beitman, 1990) and formal substance abuse
diagnoses could be found in approximately 13% of socially anxious individuals living in
non-hospital settings (Schneier et al., 1992). According to Kushner and colleagues
(1990), many patients in detoxification programs meet criteria for SAD. It has been
hypothesized that tension reduction and self-medication contribute to these elevated rates.
As previously discussed, avoidant personality disorder can be found frequently in the
presence of SAD.
Finally, it should be noted that m ost com orbid disorders develop after the onset of
SAD. Results from several large-scale data collections involving retrospective recall
indicated that symptoms of SAD occurred prior to onset of comorbid symptoms, leading
researchers to conclude that SAD usually precedes com orbid disorders (Kushner et al.,
1990; Schneier et al., 1992; Turner et al., 1991). This suggests that SAD may present a
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risk factor contributing to the development of other psychological problems.
The study of SAD is important for a variety of reasons, including the prevalence
with which it occurs, its chronic course, and the risk factors it may present for the
development o f other disorders. However, perhaps the m ost important reason to leam
more about it stems from the impairment it creates for its sufferers. SAD creates
significant interference in all aspects of life. According to Turner, Beidel, Dancu, and
Keys (1986), 92% of socially anxious inpatients reported occupational interference as a
result of this disorder. Common complaints were inability to contribute ideas in
meetings, inability to socially interact with business contacts, and lack of advancement
due to these problems. Almost 85% described academic interference with SAD, the most
common manifestation of this being inability to attend or participate in classes. Turner
and colleagues also found that 69% attributed general social problems to the disorder, and
50% had trouble with heterosocial romantic relationships. In fact, Schneier and
associates (1992) reported that individuals with SAD were less likely to marry than
people with any other anxiety disorder.
It is clear that SAD creates significant impairment and distress. Based on
previous research findings, it is also clear that the disorder will not subside without
effective treatment, indicating the necessity of such treatments (LePine & Lellouch,
1995; Levy-Cushman, M cBride, & Abeles, 1999; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Keys, 1986).
In order to determine the m ost effective way to deal with SAD, researchers have sought
to identify the behavioral and cognitive components that contribute to the anxiety.
Exam ination of the thoughts, behaviors, processes, and possible traits of individuals with
SAD can provide clinicians with areas to target in treatm ent that may allow treatments to
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work m ore effectively.
Cognitive Content in SAD
A chief component of research on SAD has been the focus on cognitive content in
social anxiety. Socially anxious individuals score higher than any other group on the
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; W atson and Friend, 1969), and thus the central
cognitive characteristic of SAD has been deemed the “fear o f negative evaluation,”
(Butler, 1985; Turner et al., 1992). Rapee (1995) described the core cognitive features of
SAD as fear of negative evaluation, perceived lack of ability, and concerns about
appearance. It has also been documented that socially anxious individuals experience
more negative and fewer positive thoughts during social interactions than non-anxious
samples (Beidel, 1985; Turner et al., 1986). Dodge (1988) surmised that the num ber of
negative thoughts was closely related to the severity and level of experienced anxiety.
Often, this type of cognitive content has been measured through self-report devices, selfexamination diaries, and recording (Rapee, 1995).
In addition, several cognitive biases have been examined. Foa, Franklin, Perry,
and Herbert (1996) discussed two faulty cognitions with regard to social interaction.
First, individuals with SAD believed that negative social events were more likely to occur
in their lives than in the lives of others. Second, participants with SAD exaggerated the
costs, or negative consequences, of a negative social event. Those with SAD reported a
belief that negative consequences resulting from perceived social failure would be
catastrophic, including perm anent exclusion from social interaction with other
individuals.
Foa and colleagues (1996) also captured cognitive distortions regarding
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experience. W hereas some aspects of the anxiety response pertained to the individual
(e.g. autonom ic arousal), the majority of the response was based on the perceived
experiences of others (e.g. “He thinks I am stupid.”)- Information about the perceptions
and experiences of others is largely inaccessible to someone with SAD, which prevents
those with SAD from disconfirm ing their own cognitive biases. According to this study,
these cognitive biases may be extremely resistant to treatment or modification. A more
detailed examination of these biases follows.
W hile fear of negative evaluation remains pervasive across situations, a num ber
of more specific fears have been identified in the disorder. According to Rapee (1995),
the most feared situation is public speaking, followed by parties, meetings, and
interacting with authority. In terms of avoidance and distress. Turner et al. (1986)
identified top-ranked fears as formal speaking, informal speaking, eating in public, and
writing in public. Other specifically identified fears have included drinking in public,
observation using office equipment, sports performance, and taking tests (Rapee, 1995).
These fears have been classified into two groups: performance and social interaction
(Rapee, 1995). However, the distinction between the two types o f fears remains
empirically unclear and points of rarity between the two have yet to be discovered.
The DSM -IV-TR (APA, 2000) states that most individuals with SAD fear only
one situation. However, research has dem onstrated that the majority of individuals with
SAD have experienced fears related to at least two situations. Turner and associates
(1986) found that less than 10% of their sample feared only one situation. Almost 43%
feared two situations, 39% feared three situations, and alm ost 10% feared four or more
situations. W ith regard to avoidance, more than 90% of this sample avoided two or more
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types of social situations.
Rapee (1995) has identified several factors that moderate fear, the m ost important
o f which is believed to be the individual’s perception of the audience. Such moderators
include the size, gender, and social status of the audience. Larger audiences, opposite sex
audiences, and audiences of higher social status all increase fear responses and anxiety.
The formality of the situation also appears to moderate fear, with more formal situations
provoking higher levels of anxiety.
To further clarify cognitive content involved in SAD, Hartman (1984) performed
a factor analysis of 21 social concerns. Four factors were revealed, which Hartman
named the “Social Evaluative Concerns.” The first, social inadequacy, involved the
extent to which the individual believed s/he lacked the skills necessary for successful
social interaction. This factor also included general psychological distress. O thers’
awareness of distress m arked the second factor. Individuals with SAD believed that
others could sense their anxiety and that others would evaluate them negatively as a result
(Leary & Kowalski, 1995). The third factor could be considered the hallmark
characteristic of SAD and has been labeled “the fear of negative evaluation.” Finally,
autonomic arousal loaded as the fourth factor. Persons with SAD experienced high levels
o f autonomic arousal, exacerbated by self-focused attention.
Self-evaluation represents another domain of cognitive content within SAD.
Rapee (1995) described pervasive negative evaluation in self-statements made by socially
anxious participants. These self-statements have been reflected in diary sentiments such
as, “Everyone thought 1 was acting inappropriately,” or “No one there wanted to talk to
m e.” Socially anxious people have also rated them selves as lacking necessary social
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skills. Self-statements in this area m ight sound like “I just don’t know how to talk to
people,” or “I always make a fool of m yself because I never know what to say.”
Concerns about appearance abound in this disorder, and self-statements in this area
reflect a negative bias: ‘‘Everyone else was dressed so nicely and I looked awful,” or
“Everyone m ust have noticed that my shoes are out of style.” These types of selfevaluative statements reflect “public self-consciousness.” Fenigstein, Schneier, and Buss
(1975) first described this process, by which socially anxious individuals viewed
themselves and others as social objects, thereby focusing excessive attention to their
outward appearances and external aspects of themselves.
W hile the cognitive content of SAD sheds light on the types of self-statements
made by individuals with social anxiety, it is also important to exam ine the process by
which these thoughts arise. This type of scrutiny may reveal the mechanisms by which
self-statements and schemas are activated, thereby illum inating the way in which socially
anxious individuals evaluate and respond to the environments around them.
Cognitive Process in SAD
The cognitive processes involved in SAD have been studied in several ways. The
m ethod o f choice for the majority of researchers in this field has been self-report of
perceptions during tasks, including the subject’s perceived attentional focus. Often,
physiological m easurements have been included in studies to determine the accuracy with
which perceived responses have been identified. In contrast, several researchers have
used experimental information processing tasks and more objective m easures of cognitive
process. Research using both methodologies has yielded relatively consistent results with
regard to self-evaluation.
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In a study of 36 individuals (12 inpatient, 12 outpatient, and 12 control
participants), Stopa and Clark (1993) found that SAD in- and out-patients recorded more
negative self-evaluative thoughts during experimental tasks than control participants.
Notably, these researchers contended that the self-evaluations made by SAD participants
were not data driven. M ore specifically, when SAD participants reported their thoughts
about social interactions, most did not mention others or specific ways in which they
were evaluated by others. Additionally, those with SAD consistently underestimated
their performances when their responses were compared to objective observer responses,
providing further evidence that SAD perceptions may not be completely accurate.
Alden and W allace (1995) also found a negative cognitive bias in self-evaluation.
This study paired 32 SAD outpatients and 32 comm unity (control) participants with an
experimental assistant on a “getting acquainted task.” The experimental assistant
engaged in either positive or negative social behaviors, and the participants were asked to
rate themselves and the assistant on social skills. Objective observers, blind to the
experimental conditions, also rated the interactions. In the “getting acquainted” task,
individuals with SAD demonstrated a bias toward negative appraisal in evaluation of
their own performances. SAD participants rated them selves poorly and were particularly
inaccurate regarding nonverbal aspects of behavior. Despite the fact that situations were
manipulated to involve positive or negative interactions, SAD participants rated both
situations equally, discounting their own social competence.
These results from the previous study have been supported by other research
demonstrating that individuals with SAD inaccurately perceive their own performances
(see Rapee, 1995). These results provide evidence for an inverse relationship between
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SAD and the individual’s ability to accurately perceive the external environment and
his/her role in it. However, the direction of this relationship has not been established in
SAD literature and may reflect the “chicken and the egg” conundrum. Researchers have
yet to discern if SAD prevents accurate perception of the external environment, or if the
individual’s evaluative style influences the development or course o f SAD.
In addition to inaccurate self-evaluation, those with SAD incorrectly evaluate the
performance of others. However, this appraisal errs on the positive and demonstrates a
bias toward perceiving the performance of others as superior. In the Alden and W allace
(1995) “getting acquainted” experiment, the experimental assistant engaged in either
positive or negative social behaviors, which were rated by the participants in both
conditions, as well as objective observers. The SAD participants rated the assistant as
more successful and more socially skilled than the assistant actually was (according to
objective observer ratings) in both positive and negative conditions, whereas the
community sample accurately perceived both their own skills and the skills of the
assistant. Some dissention exists in this area, though, as Rapee et al. (1988) demonstrated
that a SAD group rated others similarly to community sample ratings.
Turner, Beidel, and Larkin (1986) compared in- and out-patient SAD samples to a
nonclinical sample on several different situational tasks, including interacting with same
and opposite sex confederates, as well as completing questionnaires. Physiological
responses to different situations were measured and cognitive responses were gathered by
self-report. The results indicated that cognitive biases occurred differentially across
situations while physiological reactivity was influenced primarily by interaction with the
confederate. This suggests that individuals with SAD did not evaluate all situations in
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the same manner.
Rapee (1995) applied this idea to socially threatening situations and found that
individuals with SAD allocated additional resources to the detection of social threat. In a
study utilizing a Stroop color naming task with physical and social threat cues, SAD
participants demonstrated greater interference with socially threatening cues than nonanxious controls (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck, 1990). This interference
correlated with self-reported avoidance, leading these researchers to conclude that self
schemas prom oted the processing of socially threatening cues.
Self-schemas represent cognitive frameworks that individuals use to process
information. It has long been hypothesized that schemas provide a cognitive short cut to
information processing. In the case of the socially anxious, schemas may provide a faulty
or m aladaptive framework. Several studies have documented that these cognitive short
cuts prevent the socially anxious from accurately assessing or evaluating the environment
(Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Heinrichs & Hoffman, 2001; Lundh & Oest,
2001). A study using facial expression identification found that those participants with
high levels of social anxiety were less likely to accurately identify facial expressions. In
fact, high levels of social anxiety were associated with participants’ inability to identify
which pictures they had already seen (Perez-Lopez, Raul, & W oody, 2001).
It is probable that self-schemas also contribute to the interpretation of ambiguous
feedback. A study by Smith and Sarason (1975) found that socially anxious participants
attached negative m eaning to ambiguous feedback more often than participants with low
levels o f anxiety. Eysenck and colleagues reported that anxious participants were more
likely to interpret an ambiguous sentence as threatening, supporting the Smith and
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Sarason results (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & M athews, 1991). Based on research
of this nature, Hope, Rapee, Heimburg, and Dom beck (1986) drew the conclusion that
those with SAD are hypervigilant to cues of social threat. Rapee (1995) later provided
evidence that social threat sensitivity remains stable across the lifespan, indicating a
cognitive process that may prove resistant to treatment or change. Stopa and Clark
(1993) supported the importance of social threat and added that another significant
process complicating SAD involved the extent to which these individuals control their
attentional resources.
The aforementioned findings indicate that SAD interferes with the process of
evaluating the external environment. Not only do socially anxious individuals
inaccurately perceive their own performance in social situations, but they also
inaccurately perceive the performances of others in sim ilar situations (Alden and
W allace, 1995). It has also been suggested that those with SAD are also more likely to
construe ambiguous feedback as negative reflections of themselves. It seems researchers
agree that it is unclear exactly what m echanism leads to these misperceptions.
Exam ination of the extent to which someone with SAD evaluates specific factors in the
environm ent and the amount of time s/he spends processing socially threatening cues
might provide useful information for the refinement of treatments for SAD. It might also
prove useful to evaluate behavioral traits, such as the extent to which socially anxious
individuals base their behavior on specific cues from the environment. Finally, it has
been documented that allocation of attentional resources plays a significant role in the
way in which socially anxious persons construe their environments. This aspect includes
two components: the way in which the socially anxious individual evaluates his/her
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anxiety (self-focused attention), and the way in which the socially anxious individual
evaluates him -/herself as a social object (public self-consciousness).
Self-Focused Attention (SFA)
Self-focused attention has been exam ined by many researchers over the past three
decades. In a 1990 review, Ingram sought to integrate this research into a conceptual
model. W hile he hypothesized that a reasonable level of self-focus might be adaptive, he
stated that this construct could become dysfunctional. As such, Ingram outlined three
dimensions with which to evaluate self-focused attention. The first dimension, degree,
could be considered dysfunctional when “excessive” levels have been reached. Although
not operationalized by Ingram, “excessive” levels might be indicated by a degree of self
focused attention that hinders information processing. Duration, the second dimension,
found poor mental health at the “sustained” level (although specific criteria were not
outlined). FinaUy, flexibility comprised the third dimension, where psychopathology was
more likely to occur at the “inflexible” end of the flexibility continuum.
W hile Ingram (1990) contended that self-focused attention was related to a
m ultitude of psychological abnormalities, his conceptual model provided a novel
framework from which to examine SAD. Research in this area has provided an
examination of Ingram ’s first dimension, degree. Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dom beck
(1990) demonstrated that SAD outpatients displayed an increase of self-focused attention
while performing tasks, providing evidence for the phenomenon in SAD. Hope and
Heimberg (1988) showed that self-focused attention interfered with performance in
individuals with SAD. W hile Ingram never operationalized “excessive” self-focused
attention, the self-focus involved in the Hope and Heimberg study was significant enough
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to interfere with recall for interaction details, suggesting that self-focused attention
impaired the ability to process interaction details. This implies that socially anxious
individuals with high levels of self-focused attention might self-focus to the extent that
they ignore important situational cues in the environment.
Carver, Peterson, Follansbee, and Scheier (1983) dem onstrated that self-focus
paired with anxiety reduced test performance in participants who suffered from test
anxiety. However, participants without test anxiety who self-focused experienced
increased test performance. These results suggest an interaction between anxiety and
self-focus. Hope, Heimberg, and Klein (1990) also found support for excessive self
focused attention in SAD. Non-anxious participants who self-focused had superior recall
for interaction details, whereas socially anxious individuals with high levels of self
focused attention had poor recall for interaction details and more frequent omission
errors.
M ost research conducted over the past ten years has demonstrated high self
focused attention levels in SAD and many researchers agree that self-focused attention
interferes with performance in SAD. W oody and Rodriguez (2(X)0) found that self
focused attention interfered with performance in a socially anxious sample. Hope,
Gansler, and Heimberg (1989) discussed this construct in detail:
Research suggests that excessive self-focused attention is increased by
physiological arousal, interferes with task performance under some conditions,
increases the probability of internal attributions, and intensifies emotional
reactions (p. 49).
In the above instances, it seems clear that these studies illustrate the “excessive” nature of
self-focused attention in SAD.
It may be important to note that not all researchers agree on the extent to which
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self-focused attention affects performance. W oody (1996) induced high levels of self
focused attention in SAD participants by assigning speech tasks. Level of self-focused
attention was strongly related to self-reported levels of anxiety. However, she found no
evidence that high levels of self-focused attention affected performance for any of her
participants. Burgio, M erluzzi, and Pryor (1986) also found that self-focused attention
had a “lim ited effect” on performance. W hile these instances represent interesting and
notable findings, they are inconsistent with the apparent consensus among SAD
researchers that high levels of self-focused attention im pair the performance of socially
anxious individuals.
Lim ited evidence has also been found to support the two remaining components
of Ingram ’s model. In terms of duration, few researchers have exam ined the interval
separating the onset and decline of self-focused attention within the context of SAD.
Perhaps research on this topic might help to distinguish self-focused attention in SAD
from self-focused attention in other psychological disorders. Since other constructs
related to SAD remain pervasive throughout the lifespan, it seems reasonable to
hypothesize that if left untreated, self-focused attention might always contribute to the
processing of SAD. However, it has been demonstrated that this attentional style is
flexible in that focus of attention can be altered by treatment. For example, it has been
documented that levels of self-focused attention change with treatment designed to
increase externally directed attention. W oody, Chambless, and Glass (1997)
dem onstrated that CBT helped to redirect self-focused attention to external factors.
Decreases in self-focused attention were associated with positive therapeutic outcom e in
negative self-judgments and individual change. W ells and Papageorgiou (1998)
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supported these results in their finding that exposure therapy that involved teaching
participants to employ an external focus of attention was more effective in treating SAD
than exposure therapy alone.
Several researchers have exam ined the relationship between self-focused attention
and SAD but few have attem pted to document differences between this construct and
public self-consciousness. Drawing upon the works of Fenigstein and colleagues, Rapee
(1995) described public self-consciousness as attending to the external aspects of the self.
Ingram (1990) referred to self-focused attention as resources allocated to internal changes
within the individual. Additional research is necessary to determine points of rarity
between these two attending concepts. It seems clear, though, that self-focused attention
plays a significant role in SAD and that research in this area should continue to examine
this construct.
Variables in Existing M odels of SAD
M ost models describing socially anxious processing have incorporated the
cognitive aspects previously reviewed. Clark and W ells (1995) generated a popular and
plausible model which included a section deemed “processing of self as a social object,”
which was almost indistinguishable from public self-consciousness. However, they
described this as a processing bias preventing social phobics from learning from their
environments. The model described the process in which a social situation activates
schemas that detect social danger. The perceived social danger initiates behavioral,
cognitive, and somatic symptoms, as well as the processing of self as a social object. The
three types of symptoms contribute to the processing of self as a social object, which
further exacerbates perceived social danger. Finally, the three symptom types feed into
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and influence the original social situation, as the individual evaluates and responds not
only to the environment, but also to his or her own behavioral, cognitive, and somatic
symptoms and how they may appear to others.
A recent study exam ined specific components of the Clark and Wells (1995)
model. Researchers employed a method of recall for words describing both positive and
negative traits. Participants were asked to rate themselves and others on each trait, as
well as rate how others would perceive them on the traits. The latter ratings attem pted to
capture “public self-referent” information, or what others have called “processing o f self
as a social object” or “public self-consciousness.” H alf of the participants were then told
they would have to give a speech, thereby activating a social threat. Physiological
arousal was measured, after which the participants were asked to recall the trait words
they had previously read. The results provided evidence that socially anxious individuals
recalled significantly more negative trait words than those without social anxiety. In
addition, high levels of social anxiety were associated with high participant ratings of
observable anxiety. That is, those with high levels of anxiety overestimated the extent to
which that anxiety was apparent to others. These researchers concluded that the results
supported the Clark and W ells (1995) model, including the somatic and cognitive aspects
of social anxiety as well as the public self-consciousness component of the model
(Mansell & Clark, 1999).
In a sim ilar model, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) outlined a more elaborate
process. In this model, the perceived audience represented the initial factor. The
perceived audience activates the “preferential allocation of attentional resources” and the
“mental representation of self as seen by audience.” Again, this reflects the public self
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consciousness previously referenced. The preferential allocation of attentional resources
contributes to the “external indicators of negative evaluation” as individuals become
hypervigilant to socially threatening cues. The mental representation of self then
influences a “comparison of mental representation of self as seen by audience with
appraisal o f audience’s expected standard.” This elicits a “judgm ent of probability and
consequence of negative evaluation from audience.” The judgm ent results in behavioral,
cognitive, and physical symptoms of anxiety, which combine to activate perceived
internal cues that tie back in to the mental representation of self. Additionally, the
behavioral symptoms cue “external indicators of negative evaluation” and also feed in to
the mental representation of self. Several studies have exam ined and found support for
specific components of this model (Heinrichs & Hoffman, 2001; Saboonchi & Lundh,
1997; Saboonchi, Lundh, & Oest, 1999).
Both models suggest public self-consciousness when describing “processing of
self as a social object” (Clark and W ells, 1995) and “mental representation of self as seen
by audience,” (Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). However, public self-consciousness
overlooks attention directed at the internal aspects of the self. Self-focused attention
might better account for the process involved, whereby an individual focuses not only on
the mental representation of the self, but also on the internal changes occurring as a result
of the situation (ex. increased heart rate, shaking hands, sweating).
W hile both of these models address the complex process involved in SAD, they
both refrain from exam ining the extent to which each situation is exam ined by the
individual. That is, both models lack an individual differences approach to evaluation.
The Clark and W ells (1995) model lists the “social situation” as the initial trigger for
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SAD but neglects to exam ine the extent to which individuals evaluate this situation.
W hile Rapee and H eim berg (1997) incorporated perceived audience, external indicators
of negative evaluation, and perceived internal cues into their model, they neglected to
consider individual differences in the extent to which socially anxious individuals
actually evaluate these components. Two constructs may influence this process: the need
to evaluate and the personality construct self-monitoring.
The Need to Evaluate (NtE)
The Need to Evaluate is a relatively new construct defined by Jarvis and Petty
(1996) by the statement, “Individuals differ in the extent to which they chronically
engage in evaluative responding,” (p. 172). According to Jarvis and Petty, m ost areas o f
psychology have assumed that individuals engage in sim ilar evaluative responses without
regard for individual differences. Jarvis and Petty contended, however, that individual
differences exist with respect to this construct. They first listed four assertions to provide
evidence that evaluation presides over human decision. First, Jarvis and Petty cited the
1957 Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum study in which factor analysis of adjective ratings
revealed a single factor describing evaluative dimensions, which Osgood termed
“evaluative factor.” Second, a multitude of researchers have shown that attitudes can be
automatically stimulated by memory and exposure to relevant stimuli (Bargh, 1994;
Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, 1995; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983),
further indicating that evaluative responding is pervasive and relevant. A third line of
evidence emerged from the general idea that m ost people seem to have form ed opinions
about a wide variety of topics and a fourth factor supporting evaluative responding
stem m ed from the functionality of attitudes (Jarvis and Petty, 1996).
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Jarvis and Petty (1996) postulated that individual differences may be expected
with regard to the need to evaluate. One contention revolved around life experiences,
positing that different encountered situations might result in different evaluations. A
second contribution to evaluative responding might emerge from family influence. Jarvis
and Petty used the exam ple of social learning to hypothesize that children may learn to
evaluate based on evaluative responses m odeled by their parents. Motivational aspects
have been considered as well, such as enjoying evaluation or even responding to
incentives to evaluate.
Regardless of the postulated causes for individual differences, the construct still
warrants examination for several im portant reasons. Jarvis and Petty (1996) outlined
potential reasons for the exam ination of individual differences in evaluative responding.
At its m ost basic, the issue begs the question: Do these individual differences exist? If
so, several other factors, such as why and how they develop, could be addressed. Second,
research results might generalize better if participants have evaluated similar situations
outside experimental conditions. O ther reasons include possible implications for health,
stress, and coping, as well as effective advertising m echanisms for persuasion based on
evaluative responses.
Jarvis and Petty (1996) constructed a scale designed to assess individual
differences in the need to evaluate. The Need to Evaluate Scale (NES) was developed
using college students. During the initial studies for this measure, Jarvis and Petty noticed
that those high in the need to evaluate had attitudes toward a variety of life situations and
listed m ore evaluative thoughts in free listings describing paintings and typical days.
B ased on these initial findings, it seems there is support for m easurable, differential
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levels o f evaluative responding.
Very few researchers have exam ined the relationship between the need to
evaluate and SAD. However, this construct may constitute an integral component of
cognitive processing in SAD. Incorporating the need to evaluate brings individual
differences into the process for the first time. This may account for and explain
inconsistent findings in the literature, such as why some participants do not perform as
well when self-focusing and others are relatively unaffected (Carver et al., 1983; W oody,
1996). One preliminary study found a trend toward lower levels of Need to Evaluate in
the socially anxious (Klocek, Carmin, Shertzer, & Paidas, 2000). However, small sample
size prevented complete examination of these effects. In an effort to better understand
the disorder and develop effective treatments, future research m ust examine the need to
evaluate and its relevance to SAD.
Self-M onitoring (SM)
Self-monitoring was first outlined as a personality construct in the early 1970’s.
W hile the field of social psychology had been exam ining many dimensions of
interpersonal interaction, several researchers had taken notice of individual differences in
interpersonal functioning. They began to ask the question, “To what extent do
individuals modify their behaviors based on the situations in which they find
them selves?” Snyder (1974) noticed that individuals seem ed to differ in the extent to
which they evaluated external cues, as well as the extent to which individuals would
modify their behaviors based on specific situations. Integrating previous research,
Snyder began to exam ine the ways in which individuals m onitored (observed and
controlled) their self-presentation and expressive behaviors. He labeled this new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Anxiety

24

construct “self-m onitoring.” W hile this construct may overlap with self-focused
attention, a distinction may be drawn between self-focused attention and self-monitoring
in that self-focused attention refers to the way in which an individual focuses on internal
aspects o f the self, whereas self-monitoring represents a personality characteristic that
determines the extent to which the individual focuses outward to the external
environm ent for indicators of appropriate behavior. (It should be noted that the term
“self-monitoring” shall be used hereafter to refer to the personality construct as outlined
by Snyder (1974), and shall not refer to self-observation methods of data collection or
treatm ent intervention.)
Studies exam ining individual differences in self-monitoring delineated five goals
or purposes of engaging in self-monitoring. The first was communication of a true
emotion by exaggerating expression in order for that emotion to be detected by others.
The second goal was communication of an arbitrary emotion that was incongruent with
actual emotions, so that a “socially acceptable” feeling relevant to the situation was being
expressed. The third goal involved properly concealing an inappropriate emotion and
replacing it with apathy or indifference, whereas the fourth goal extended the concealing
of an inappropriate emotion and replaced it with expression of an acceptable feeling. In
this manner, socially inappropriate emotions have been hidden or replaced. The fifth and
final goal o f self-monitoring was conveyed emotional experience when no emotion was
felt, thereby matching the emotions of those surrounding the individual. These
characteristics of self-monitoring led Snyder to the conclusion;
“The self-monitoring individual is one who, out of a concern for social
appropriateness, is particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of
others in social situations and uses these cues as guidelines for monitoring his
own self-presentation,” (Snyder, 1974, p. 528).
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Social psychology has produced large quantities of research examining selfm onitoring and its effects on interpersonal functioning. Snyder (1983) determined that
high levels of self-monitoring were indicative of someone whose behavior could be
predicted by specific situations, whereas low levels of self-monitoring indicated an
individual whose behavior could be predicted by traits and attitudes. Snyder and
Kendzierski, (1982) also demonstrated that self-monitoring influenced the types o f social
situations participants were willing to enter. Those with low self-monitoring levels
would only willingly enter into social situations where their beliefs and attitudes were
congruent with a group’s. Those with high levels of self-monitoring were willing to enter
any situation, regardless of the dominant beliefs and attitudes in the group. These results
were repeated in a sim ilar study. Snyder and Gangestad (1982) found that high self
monitoring participants were willing to enter any situation as long as it was clearly
defined, whereas low self-monitoring participants were again only willing to enter
situations congruent with their own personalities. These studies indicate that high selfmonitorers possess the freedom to interact in any situation, while low levels o f self
m onitoring indicate an individual who feels com pelled to interact only in situations with
which they are somewhat familiar.
Self-monitoring tendencies have been linked to psychological health, successful
social interactions, greater numbers of friendships, and attainm ent of and advancement in
careers (Snyder, 1995; Snyder and Simpson, 1987). High levels of this trait have also
been linked to accurate descriptions of others, whereas low levels have been linked to
poorer descriptions of others but better descriptions of people like themselves (Snyder
and Cantor, 1980). Finally, it has been demonstrated that high levels of self-monitoring
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allow the individual to separate attitudes from behavior to the extent that an unsuccessful
social interaction would not be internalized. Those with low self-monitoring tendencies
blam ed their own discrepant behavior as the cause of the social failure (Snyder and
Tanke, 1976).
Given the interpersonal nature of this personality construct, it seems surprising
that no research has exam ined self-monitoring in relation to SAD. The characteristics of
high levels of self-monitoring represent the inverse of SAD symptoms. Clark and Wells
(1995) described a cognitive bias that prevented social phobics from learning from their
environments. Perhaps this bias can be described as low levels of self-monitoring in the
socially anxious. One purpose of this research includes exam ination of the nature of this
trait as it relates to SAD.
Summarv
Background literature on SAD has revealed that it is a chronic and unremitting
disease affecting, on average, 13% of the population. The most pervasive anxiety
disorder, it has been associated with interference in many areas of life. Social phobics
tend to fear a number o f situations, and thus they fall into the diagnostic subtype of
“Generalized Social Anxiety,” which has been associated with more severe anxiety and
greater life interference. As such, effective treatm ents have become increasingly
important.
Extensive research has been conducted as to the cognitive content and processes
involved in the disorder. Existing models have sought to integrate this research but have
neglected several important concepts, such as self-focused attention, self-monitoring, and
individual differences in evaluative responding. A prospective model has incorporated
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the three constructs as an explanation of SAD. However, these models will only take us
so far. M odels can be useful in hypothesizing relevant constructs; they will not serve to
lessen the interference in the daily lives of social phobics until we can apply these
constructs to useful and effective treatments. An individual differences approach may be
useful in this respect, in that treatments can be tailored to the needs of individuals with
SAD.
The current research project will attempt to address the extent to which these
constructs, the need to evaluate, self-monitoring, and self-focused attention actually apply
to SAD. It is hypothesized that a strong relationship will emerge between social anxiety
and self-focused attention, as has been dem onstrated in previous research. A second
hypothesis posits that level of need to evaluate will relate to social anxiety, and, in
concert with self-focused attention, may explain more variance in social anxiety than
focus of attention alone. Finally, it has been hypothesized that self-monitoring will
predict additional variance in social anxiety, above and beyond that predicted by the
previous variables.
M ethod
Participants
Participants in this study w ere volunteers from the Introduction to Psychology
courses at the University of M ontana and were offered course credit for participation
(N=129). Pow er analysis of this sample size yielded power of .90. These participants
were m ostly male (66%) and the mean age was 20 years old. They completed several
questionnaires in large-scale classroom administrations of approximately 40 participants
per session. Each participant reviewed and signed informed consent forms, and each was
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provided a copy of this form to keep. In addition, a debriefing form was given to each
participant upon completion of the measures.
Procedures
Sessions occurred in classroom-type settings on the University of M ontana’s
M issoula campus. Informed consent was carefully discussed. The informed consent
form made clear that participation was voluntary and that participants were free to leave
at any time without penalty. The researcher allowed time for questions before
participants signed the form. These forms were then collected and kept separate from the
remaining data. No identifying information was directly associated with the remaining
data. Participants then com pleted seven measures: the Fear of Negative Evaluation
Scale- Revised (FNE-R), the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale- Revised (SAD-R), the
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS), the Social Phobia Scale (SPS), the Need to
Evaluate Scale (NES), the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), and the Self-Monitoring
Scale (self-monitoring). Upon completion, the participants handed in their measures and
signed their names on sheets that were turned in for Psychology 100 credit. In the event
that participants wished to leave without completion, their measures were collected and
they received credit. Only one student wished to discontinue the study after reading
through the measures.
Fear o f Negative Evaluation Scale- Revised (FNE-R)
The FNE is a 30-item scale developed by W atson and Friend (1969). It was
designed to assess the primary characteristic of SAD, the fear o f negative evaluation. All
items are statements against which agreement is m easured by a 5 point Likert-type scale
(e.g. “I am afraid that others will not approve of m e” ). Seventeen items are reverse-
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scored and a sum of all items is calculated.
The original scale possessed sound psychometric properties. The scale strongly
correlated with sim ilar measures and did not correlate with measures of distinct
constructs (W atson & Friend, 1969). This scale was recalibrated in 1999 from its original
true-false format into a 5-point Likert-type scale. The revised version has demonstrated
adequate validity and reliability (Gillock, Carmin, Klocek, and Raja, 1999). In the
current study, the FNE-R correlated with other social anxiety m easures (see Table 2),
indicating construct validity. Cronbach's alpha for the sample in this study was .84,
indicating adequate reliability for this sample.
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD-R)
This measure is a 28-item scale developed by W atson and Friend (1969) to assess
anxiety in and avoidance of social interactions and performance situations. The
recalibrated version measures agreement with 28 statements using a 5 point Likert-type
scale. Fourteen items are reverse-scored and a sum of all items is calculated. ). Sample
items include, “I often find social occasions upsetting,” and “W hen my superiors want to
talk with me, I talk willingly.”
The original scale possessed good psychometric properties, including adequate
reliability coefficients for the original sample. The scale strongly correlated with sim ilar
measures and did not correlate with measures of distinct constructs, indicating good
construct validity (W atson & Friend, 1969). This scale was recalibrated in 1999 from its
original true-false form at into a 5-point Likert-type scale. The revised version has
demonstrated adequate validity and reliability (Gillock, Carmin, Klocek, and Raja, 1999).
In the current study, the SAD-R correlated with other social anxiety measures (see Table
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2), supporting construct validity. Cronbach's alpha for the sample in this study was .97,
indicating superior reliability for these participants.
Social Interaction A nxiety Scale (SIAS)
The SIAS was designed to measure anxiety experienced during a broad range of
social interactions and consists of 19 items (M attick and Clarke, 1998). Participants rate
agreement to the 19 statements using a 5 point Likert-type scale. Two items are reversescored and a sum of all items is calculated. This measure produced reliable scores
(Cronbach’s alpha = .8S-.94) for previous samples reported in the literature (M attick &
Clarke, 1998). Adequate discriminant and construct validities have been demonstrated
by the authors. In the current study, the SIAS correlated with other social anxiety
measures, indicating adequate construct validity (see Table 2). Superior reliability was
also obtained for the current sample (Cronbach's alpha was .92). Sample items include,
“I have difficulty making eye-contact with others,” and “I am unsure whether to greet
someone I know only slightly.”
Social Phobia Scale (SPS)
The SPS is a 20-item scale designed to measure anxiety over being scrutinized
during common activities (M attick and Clarke, 1998). Responses are assessed using a 5
point Likert-type scale. Sample items include, “I becom e anxious if I have to write in
front of others,” and “I fear I may blush when I am with others.” A sum of all items is
calculated.
The authors have shown the scale to possess adequate validity (construct and
discriminant) and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .89 .94) (M attick and Clarke, 1998). In
the current study, the SPS correlated with other measures of social anxiety (see Table 2),
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indicating good construct validity. In addition, Cronbach's alpha for the current sample
was .92, demonstrating superior reliability for this sample.
N eed to Evaluate Scale (NtE)
This scale is a 16-item measure developed by Jarvis and Petty (1996). It is
designed to assess the extent to which individuals engage in evaluative responding of
their external environments. The scale m easures agreement between statements and
responses using a 5-point Likert-type scale. Ten items are reverse-scored and a sum of
all items is calculated. The Need to Evaluate Scale has a high degree of internal
consistency (Cronbach’s a = .87) (Jarvis & Petty, 1996). The scale yields one factor in
factor analysis and possesses a high test-retest reliability (.84) (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).
Sample items include, “I form opinions about everything,” “I like to decide that new
things are really good or really bad,” and “I have m any more opinions than the average
person.”
Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS)
This is a 16-item scale developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975). Two
subscales are included: a nine-item scale designed to measure private self-consciousness
(self-focused attention) and a seven-item public self-consciousness scale. Items are
statements against which agreement is m easured by a 4 point Likert-type scale. A recent
confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that the scale measures three dimensions:
rumination on the general self (self-focused attention), monitoring of specific aspects of
self (self-focused attention), and public self-consciousness (Martin and Debus, 1999).
Self-M onitoring Scale (SM)
This measure is a revision of and replaces the original scale developed by Snyder
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(1974). The scale was designed to reveal the extent to which individuals m onitor
(observe and control) their expressive behavior. The original 25-item scale was pared
down to 18 True-False items (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). One point is given for each
response o f “True,” and 10 items are reverse-scored. This scale has demonstrated
internal consistency ( a = .70). Factor analysis reveals one factor accounting for 62% of
the variance. Sample item s include “I would probably make a good actor,” “I ’m not
always the person I appear to be,” and “I may deceive people by being friendly when I
really dislike them .”
Hvpotheses and Proposed Statistical Analvses
Hypothesis One: There will be positive relationships between self-focused
attention and social anxiety and public self-consciousness and social anxiety, such that
levels o f self-focused attention and public self-consciousness may predict level of social
anxiety.
Hypothesis Two: There will be a relationship between Need to Evaluate and SAD
such that level of Need to Evaluate will predict level of social anxiety above and beyond
that predicted by the focus of attention variables.
Hypothesis Three: There will be a relationship between self-monitoring and social
anxiety, such that level of self-monitoring may predict the level o f social anxiety above
and beyond that predicted by focus of attention and Need to Evaluate.
Once data was collected, it was entered into an SPSS spreadsheet. Analyses
included computation of descriptive statistics, correlations between all variables,
including demographic information, reliability coefficients for all the measures used, and
hierarchical regression. Hierarchical regression allowed the variables to be entered in a
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particular sequence, rather than simultaneously. Scores on the Self-Consciousness, Need
to Evaluate, and Self-M onitoring scales were entered as predictor variables (IV’s), and
scores on the social anxiety measures served as criterion variables (D V ’s). The focus of
attention variables were entered first, as the relationships between self-focused attention,
public self-consciousness, and SAD have been previously established. The second step
incorporated the Need to Evaluate into the model. The overall

was expected to

increase, indicating that level of Need to Evaluate predicted explained variance in social
anxiety scores above and beyond focus of attention. Finally, a third step added SelfM onitoring as a predictor to the equation. This variable was entered last due to lack of a
previous established relationship in the literature. An increase in

would indicate that

degree of Self-monitoring did, in fact, predict level of social anxiety above and beyond
focus o f attention and Need to Evaluate.
Results
Descriptive statistics for each measure are presented in Table 1. Correlations
between age, gender, and each variable were exam ined but no significant findings
emerged.
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Descriptive Statistics for Social Anxiety, Focus of Attention, and Self-monitoring
M easures

M easure

M ean

SD

a

SAD-R

42.09

24.32

.97

FNE-R

82.64

16.05

.84

SIAS

20.53

12.24

.92

SPS

18.16

12.82

.92

SFA- Private

16.58

5.01

.65

SFA- Public

12.55

4.60

.84
.77

SFA- Full Scale
NTE

44.84

10.20

.81

SM

7.47

3.46

.71

Note. SA D -R Social Anxiety and Distress Scale- Revised, FN E -R Fear of Negative
Evaluation Scale- Revised, SIA S Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPS Social Phobia
Scale, SFA P riv ate Self-focused Attention Private Self-consciousness Scale, SFAP u b lic Self-focused Attention Public Self-consciousness Scale, N T E Need to Evaluate
Scale, SM Self-monitoring Scale.
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C ronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients were exam ined in order to determine the
internal consistency of the scores on all measures. These scores are also presented in
Table 1. Although alpha coefficients for the four social anxiety measures indicate
adequate reliability for this sample, it is notable that the Fear of Negative Evaluation
Scale- Revised (FNE-R) coefficient is lower than the others. This is not consistent with
past research (M attick & Clarke, 1998; W atson & Friend, 1969), which indicates that the
FN E-R produces scores comparable in reliability to other social anxiety measures used in
this study. It is hypothesized that smaller sample size contributed to this finding. Despite
the lower coefficient than other social anxiety measures, the alpha coefficient for the
FNE-R was still within the acceptable range.
Relationships Between Social Anxietv. Focus of Attention. Need to Evaluate, and Selfm onitoring
Correlations between study variables are presented in Table 2. Many significant
correlations indicated strong relationships between several study variables.
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Table 2
Correlations Between Research M easures

M easure

SAD-R

SAD-R

1.00

FNE-R

.28**

1.00

SIAS

.42**

.45**

1.00

SPS

.38**

.40**

.74**

1.00

SFA-Pr

.03

.13

.06

.03

1.00

SFA-Pu

.07

.43**

.35**

.30**

.31**

1.00

NTE

-.06

-.16

-.01

-.12

.35**

.22*

1.00

SM

.27**

.07

.27**

.14

-.21**

-.19*

-.19*

FNE-R

SIAS

SPS

SFA-Pr

SFA-Pu

NTE

♦Correlation is statistically significant at the .05 a level (2 tailed).
** Correlation is statistically significant at the .01 a level (2 tailed).
Note. SA D -R Social A nxiety and Distress Scale- Revised, F N E -R Fear of Negative
Evaluation Scale- Revised, SIA S Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, SPS Social Phobia
Scale, S F A -P r Self-focused Attention Private Self-consciousness Scale, SFA -Pu Self
focused Attention Public Self-consciousness Scale, N T E Need to Evaluate Scale, SM
Self-m onitoring Scale.
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Relationships between all social anxiety measures were first investigated in order
to determ ine validity of the study. As expected, each measure of social anxiety
significantly correlated with the other measures of social anxiety. This is consistent with
previous findings using these four measures. However, the correlations presented in
Table 2 between social anxiety measures are significantly lower than those found in
previous literature (Klocek et al., 2002; M attick & Clarke, 1998).
The relationships between the focus of attention variables were exam ined next
using the Self-consciousness Scale. Because the Self-consciousness Scale is comprised
o f two subscales, Public and Private, the relationship between subscales was scrutinized.
A m oderate relationship between the Public and Private Self-consciousness became
evident (r = .31, p < .01). Given the internal consistency for the entire scale (.77), this
was not unexpected. W hen examining the relationship between focus of attention and
social anxiety, several moderate correlations were observed. Strong positive
relationships emerged between scores on the Public Self-consciousness subscale and
scores on the FNE-R (r = .43, p < .01), scores on the Public Self-consciousness subscale
and scores on the SIAS (r = .35, p < .01), and scores on the Public Self-consciousness
subscale and scores on the SPS (r = .30, p < .01). These findings were expected due to
the previously established relationship between self-focused attention (public selfconsciousness) and social anxiety level. As expected, there were no significant
correlations between scores on the Private Self-consciousness subscale and social anxiety
level.
The next step involved exam ining the relationships between Need to Evaluate
Scale scores and study variables. The Need to Evaluate scores were not significantly
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correlated with any of the four social anxiety measures, indicating that no direct
relationship between Need to Evaluate scores and social anxiety level could be found in
this sample. However, Need to Evaluate scores did correlate moderately with focus of
attention variables. M oderate positive relationships were found between these scores and
scores on both the Private Self-consciousness subscale (r = .35, g < .01) and the Public
Self-consciousness subscale (r = .22, p < .05). These findings indicate the possibility of
overlap between the two constructs, particularly where allocation of attentional resources
is concerned. Conversely, a significant negative relationship was observed between Need
to Evaluate scores and Self-monitoring Scale scores (r = -.19, p < .05), indicating a small
inverse relationship between the two constructs.
Finally, the relationships between self-monitoring and study variables were
explored. Significant positive relationships m aterialized between Self-monitoring Scale
scores and scores on the SAD-R (r = .27, p < .01) and SIAS (r = .27, p < .01), indicating a
relationship between self-monitoring and social anxiety. This relationship has not been
found in previous literature. In addition, Self-monitoring scores were inversely related to
Public Self-consciousness subscale scores (r = -.19, p < .05). This makes logical sense
given that self-monitoring involves evaluation of the external environment while public
self-consciousness involves attending to the internal aspects of the self. No significant
relationship was found between Self-monitoring scores and Private Self-consciousness
subscale scores. Finally, an inverse relationship occurred between Self-monitoring scores
and Need to Evaluate scores (r = -.19, p < .05), possibly emphasizing the distinction
between these two constructs. The specifics of potential distinction will be outlined in
the discussion section that follows.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Anxiety

39

Accounting for Variance in Social Anxietv Level

In order to determine which study variables predicted social anxiety level, a
regression analysis was conducted. Hierarchical regression was employed due to the
previously established relationships between these variables and the theoretical overlap
between the constructs. The criterion variable, social anxiety level, was operationalized
as the sum of scores on four social anxiety m easures divided by four. Because the
relationship between focus of attention and social anxiety had been consistently reported,
the Self-consciousness Scale scores were entered in the first step. The Need to
Evaluate/social anxiety relationship was unclear in previous findings. Therefore, scores
on the N eed to Evaluate Scale were entered in the second step. Finally, self-monitoring,
as m easured by the Self-monitoring Scale, was entered in the third step in order to assess
its unique contribution to social anxiety. Results of these analyses are presented in Table
3.
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Table 3
Separating Variance in Social Anxietv Scores Accounted for bv Focus of Attention
Scores. N eed to Evaluate Scores, and Self-monitoring Scores.

M odel/ Predictor
Variable

AR^

t

P

P

Part

Partial

1. Focus o f Attention

.115

.115

4.07

.00

.340

.340

.340

2. Focus of Attention
Need to Evaluate

.152

.037

4.55
-2.35

.00
.02

.382
-.197

.373
-.193

.376
-.205

3. Focus of Attention
Need to Evaluate
Self-M onitoring

.245

.093

5.36
-1.85
3.93

.00
.07
.00

.432
-.149
.315

.417
-.143
.305

.433
-.163
.331

Note. M odel 1 includes Self-focused Attention Private and Public Self-consciousness
Subscales, M odel 2 added the Need to Evaluate Scale, and M odel 3 added the Selfm onitoring Scale.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Anxiety

41

The focus o f attention variables were entered first as predictors of social anxiety
level. M odel 1 was found to account for approxim ately 11.5% of the variance in social
anxiety level (F (1, 127) = 16.55, p < .00). The strong correlation between public selfconsciousness and social anxiety indicated that public self-consciousness was likely
responsible for m ost of the variance among the two focus of attention variables.
The second step involved entering scores on the Need to Evaluate Scale into the
regression equation with the focus of attention variables. This second model resulted in a
significant change to the overall variance explained by the equation (F) (1, 126) = 5.52, p
< .02), accounting for an additional 3.7% (p < .05) of the variance in social anxiety level.
This represents the unique contribution of Need to Evaluate scores to total variance in
social anxiety level, where Need to Evaluate scores uniquely explained 3.7% of the
variance and Public Self-consciousness scores uniquely contributed 13.91%.
The final step involved the addition of Self-monitoring scores to the regression
equation. The addition of this variable contributed significantly to the overall variance in
social anxiety, adding 9.3% more explained variance to the model (p < .01). This also
represents the unique contribution of Self-monitoring scores to social anxiety level. In
Model 3, Public Self-consciousness scores uniquely explained 17.39% of the variance
while Need to Evaluate scores uniquely explained 2% of the total variance in social
anxiety level. The change in variance from Model 2 to M odel 3 was also significant (F
(3, 125) = 13.55, p < .00). This brought the total explained variance in social anxiety
level, as predicted by Focus of Attention scores. Need to Evaluate scores, and Self
m onitoring scores, to 24.5%.
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In addition to the above regression results, interactions between variables were
exam ined after accounting for main effects. This was accomplished by multiplying
scores on relevant m easures (SFA X NTE, SFA X SM, NTE X SM ) and entering the
products into the regression equation using the same criterion variable (sum of four social
anxiety measures divided by four). The addition of these interactions to the regression
equation yielded no significant results.
These results illuminate the relationships between social anxiety, focus of
attention, need to evaluate, and self-monitoring. They indicate that focus of attention
(primarily public self-consciousness) and self-monitoring both significantly predict level
of social anxiety. The Need to Evaluate also significantly predicts social anxiety level,
although not nearly as well as the previous two variables.
Discussion
This study sought to exam ine the relationships between focus of attention. Need
to Evaluate, Self-monitoring and social anxiety level. Specifically, it was predicted that
each of these variables w ould account for unique variance in social anxiety level.
Hypothesis One stated that there would be positive relationships between self-focused
attention and social anxiety and public self-consciousness and social anxiety, such that
levels of self-focused attention and public self-consciousness would predict level of
social anxiety. Hypothesis Two stated that there w ould be a relationship between Need
to Evaluate and social anxiety level, such that level of Need to Evaluate would predict
level of social anxiety above and beyond that predicted by the focus of attention
variables. Hypothesis Three stated that there would be a relationship between Self
m onitoring and social anxiety, such that level of Self-m onitoring w ould predict the level
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o f social anxiety above and beyond that predicted by focus of attention and Need to
Evaluate.
D ata was collected from 129 undergraduates at the University of M ontana on 7
questionnaires in order to exam ine the hypothesized relationships. Power of .90 was
obtained, indicating that the sample size was large enough to detect results. The sample
was com prised of 66% male and 33% female participants, and the mean age was 20 years
old. The demographic characteristics do not appear to have affected the results of the
study.
Results from the analyses supported all three hypotheses. The first hypothesis
stated that focus of attention w ould predict level of social anxiety. This was supported by
the first regression model, indicating that focus of attention does, in fact, account for a
significant amount o f variance in social anxiety level. The second hypothesis stated that
the addition of Need to Evaluate level w ould account for variance above and beyond that
predicted by focus of attention. Support for this hypothesis can be found in Model 2.
Although the addition of Need to Evaluate did result in significant changes to the model,
the changes were small. Finally, the third hypothesis stated that the addition of Self
monitoring would account for variance above and beyond that predicted by the previous
2 models. Again, this hypothesis was supported by M odel 3, indicating that Self
monitoring accounts for variance in social anxiety not accounted for by the other
variables.
Upon closer examination, results supporting the first hypothesis represent and are
consistent with previous findings. It has been well docum ented that focus of attention is
related to social anxiety level; specifically, self-focused attention is predictive of social
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anxiety level (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Hope, Heimberg, & Klein, 1990; Hope, Rapee,
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Hope, Gansburg, & Heimberg, 1989; Woody &
Rodriguez, 2000). Findings from this study provide further support for that relationship,
such that self-focused attention increases as social anxiety level increases. This supports
existing models of social anxiety that draw a causal link between the action of selffocussing (e.g. focusing on the internal aspects of the self, such as racing heartbeat,
shaking hands, etc.) and the exacerbation of anxiety symptoms.
C loser examination of the second hypothesis reveals interesting results. Although
the addition of the Need to Evaluate did result in significant changes to the model, those
changes were small. This indicates that, although Need to Evaluate does explain some
variance in social anxiety level, the amount of variance it predicts is not as significant as
other variables. It would seem that other variables have a greater impact on social
anxiety level than this. There was a moderate inverse relationship between Need to
Evaluate and social anxiety level, indicating that as social anxiety level increases, Need
to Evaluate level decreases. This may be understood by exam ining the attentional focus
o f the socially anxious. Because self-focused attention predicted social anxiety level so
strongly, it is likely that most attentional resources are allocated to self-focused attention.
Therefore, there w ould not be adequate resources available to evaluate the external
environment. For exam ple, a social phobic who is forced to give a speech may spend so
much energy focussing on his/her racing heartbeat, shaking hands and knees, sweating
palms, etc., that s/he is unable to then evaluate the responses and cues being given by the
audience. This would explain previous findings that social phobics inaccurately perceive
feedback from those around them (Alden & W allace, 1995).
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The addition of self-monitoring to the social anxiety model deserves further
com m ent as well. Self-monitoring predicted and accounted for a significant amount of
the variance in social anxiety level, even after the other variables’ variance had been
partitioned out. That is, self-monitoring predicted social anxiety level above and beyond
that predicted by the other variables. This indicates that this variable uniquely accounts
for approximately 9.3% o f the variance in social anxiety level.
A positive relationship was found between self-monitoring and social anxiety,
indicating that as self-monitoring increases, so does social anxiety level. Initially, this
might not make sense, given the extemal-focus aspect of self-monitoring and the
previous results with Need to Evaluate that suggested that the socially anxious were not
evaluating the external environment. These findings seem to diverge. However, this may
make more sense when one considers the 2-step process involved in Self-monitoring.
The first step represents evaluating the external environm ent for cues as to how to behave
and the second step involves selecting an appropriate behavior based on those cues. The
results from the need to evaluate suggest that socially anxious individuals are not
engaging in external evaluation. However, this may be because they are overly focused
on the second step of self-monitoring, selecting the appropriate behavior. This over
focus on selection of behavior m ay constitute a separate, previously un-examined aspect
of self-focused attention.
There are several implications of these findings. First, previous research on the
relationship between self-focused attention and social anxiety has received support from
these results. Socially anxious individuals tend to focus their attention inward. Second,
the inward focus of attention may im pair the ability to focus outward, as demonstrated by
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the inverse relationship between social anxiety and need to evaluate. Socially anxious
individuals may then miss out on important cues presented by the situation or observer
because their attention is occupied by the internal aspects of their anxiety. Third, the
relationship between social anxiety and self-monitoring seems to confirm the previous
two statements, as the socially anxious do engage in selection of appropriate behaviors
but without evaluating the environm ent for cues. This may explain some past research
indicating that, despite their own perceptions, socially anxious individuals engage in
successful social interactions and demonstrate appropriate social behaviors (Alden &
W allace, 1995; Rapee, 1995; Stopa & Clark, 1993).
Im plications of these results have both theoretical and clinical applications. The
addition o f the self-monitoring component to new or existing models of social anxiety
may better account for the cognitive processes involved in the disorder, particularly
where attentional focus is concerned. M odification of models to include this construct, or
at least the behavioral selection aspect, may result in a more comprehensive
understanding of the disorder. In terms of clinical application, it seems clear that socially
anxious individuals are not evaluating their environments. In not doing so, they are likely
m issing important information that could not only allow them to observe appropriate
behaviors for specific situations, but also information that might allow them to more
accurately perceive their own behaviors. An extem al-focus component could be added to
existing treatments for social anxiety, and might result in selection of more appropriate
behaviors or being able to perceive when others have deem ed the social phobic’s
behavior to be successful. Clinicians who have already incorporated an extemal-focus
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aspect into CBT have noted the effectiveness of this cognitive redirection of attention
(W ells & Papageorgiou, 1998).
Although these results are meaningful, they should be considered in context.
Because this study was not experimental, one cannot say that any of the study variables
caused social anxiety level. Although relationships have been established between these
variables, one does not know the temporal order of the emergence of the variables. This
may be considered a threat to the internal validity of the study. Additionally, there may
be considerable overlap between the variables. If the questionnaires all measured aspects
o f the same construct (e.g. external focus), this might bias the results by demonstrating
that these variables each uniquely contribute to social anxiety when, in fact, they are all
m easuring aspects of the same construct. Internal validity may have been threatened by
other potential confounding variables as well. For example, there may be mediating
and/or moderating variables which were not studied but could have affected those
variables being studied. Because the study involved only one session, no treatment, and
no assignment to different conditions, internal threats such as selection, history,
m aturation, regression artifacts, attrition, and instrumentation were not of concern.
External validity may have been threatened by the use of a limited sample (N =
129), a primarily male sample (66%), and a relatively young sample (mean age = 20
years old). This study only utilized Introduction to Psychology students at a m edium 
sized, Pacific-Northwestern university. It is very possible that this sample may not be
representative of the larger population of university students and non-students. Also, the
study was conducted during a specific time frame (fall semester). As such, these results
m ight not generalize to the population as a whole.
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M easurem ent issues may also be at play. W hile the social anxiety measures all
purported to be assessing different dimensions of social anxiety, the correlations between
them indicated that they were measuring sim ilar or overlapping constructs. It is possible
that these four measures do not assess specific aspects of social anxiety that might
influence the results. Although each measure was selected for its demonstrated
psychometric properties, it is possible that any of the measures could inaccurately assess
the construct that it was designed to assess. However, authors of each measure have
provided adequate validity information and the measures have all been used extensively
within psychology literature. Finally, reliability always poses a potential threat to the
external validity of a study. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, which assess reliability for a
particular sample, were all within adequate range for the measures used in this study.
Although the overall reliability of the Self-consciousness Scale was acceptable, one
subscale (Private Self-consciousness) showed lower reliability than researchers would
generally accept. Results from the use of that subscale have been interpreted
accordingly.
The results from this study indicate that attentional focus plays a strong role in
social anxiety. These results should be exam ined further in order to better understand the
relationships between focus of attention variables and social anxiety level. Further
research might address the need to evaluate and social anxiety, as a different relationship
may emerge in a different context. Future research may also wish to incorporate these
findings into a more complete model of social anxiety that might emphasize self-focused
attention, as well as the process of selecting appropriate behaviors for specific situations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Social Anxiety

D oing so m ight result in a better understanding of the disorder, not only for theoretical
ideologies, but also for practical application as well.
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